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Can Contracts Replace Qualification in a Sourcing
Process With Competitive Suppliers
and Imperfect Information?
Yue Jin and Jennifer K. Ryan

Abstract—This paper considers a manufacturer who outsources
the production of a product to multiple competing suppliers, who
differ in their cost structures and in their capabilities for producing
high-quality products. The manufacturer must design the sourcing
process to ensure that the selected supplier has sufficient quality
capability, while encouraging competition among the suppliers.
We develop and analyze a mathematical model of performancebased contracting, a sourcing method that is appropriate when
the manufacturer has imperfect information regarding the suppliers’ costs and capabilities. We compare the performance of
performance-based contracting with that of a two-stage sourcing
process, an alternative sourcing method that is more commonly
used in practice. The theoretical results and managerial insights
derived from this research can enable manufacturing firms to improve the management of their sourcing processes. In particular,
we demonstrate that performance-based contracting with a symmetric linear penalty/reward function will always outperform the
two-stage sourcing process from the perspective of the buyer and
that the optimal penalty/reward rate is less than or equal to the
unit warranty cost. In addition, performance-based contracting
generally leads to a higher quality level provided by the winning
supplier. However, the winning supplier is generally better off under the two-stage sourcing process.
Index Terms—Auction mechanisms, procurement, sourcing.

I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
ECENT years have seen an increase in the use of outsourcing in a variety of industries, with the goal of reducing costs and obtaining operational efficiencies [1]. As a
result, manufacturers must make strategic decisions regarding
the design of their sourcing processes, including how to qualify
potential suppliers and how to select among the set of potential suppliers. Recent years have also seen an increase in the
use of procurement auctions as part of the sourcing process [2].
Auctions can induce competitive bidding, resulting in increased
competition between suppliers and reduced procurement
costs [3].
Sourcing process design, including the design of auctionbased mechanisms, can be complex due to a number of
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factors. First, manufacturers often care about attributes besides
just price, including quality, reliability, and payment terms.
A second source of complexity arises when the manufacturer
has imperfect information regarding the suppliers’ characteristics. Finally, sourcing process design is complex due to the
fact that the nature of that process can influence the product
characteristics or attributes offered by the suppliers. Suppliers
choose their bidding strategies, including how they set the nonprice attributes, such as product quality, in order to maximize
their chance of winning the buyer’s business, while simultaneously minimizing their costs. Thus, how the buyer evaluates
bids will influence the suppliers’ bidding strategies and product
offerings.
A. Multiattribute Procurement Mechanisms
There are a number of alternatives for selecting among suppliers when the buyer cares about multiple attributes. EngelbrechtWiggans et al. [4] provide the following categorization. Under
request for quotation (RFQ) and request for proposal (RFP),
the buyer provides detailed specifications to the suppliers. Under RFQ, the suppliers are required to meet the specifications
and the buyer selects among those suppliers based on cost. Under RFP, the suppliers submit proposals which are evaluated by
the buyer, with the contract awarded to the best overall supplier, as determined by the buyer, perhaps through the use of
a score function. Reverse auctions are “structured” versions of
the RFQ and RFP mechanisms. Price-based (PB) reverse auctions are analogous to an RFQ. They are binding, i.e., the buyer
commits in selecting the supplier with the lowest bid price.
Buyer-determined (BD) reverse auctions are analogous to an
RFP. They are not binding, i.e., the buyer can select the winning
supplier as she sees fit. Multiattribute auctions allow suppliers
to bid on multiple dimensions, rather than just price. The buyer
evaluates bids using a score function which converts the bid into
a single number. These auctions are not widely used in practice
[5], [6].
Additional mechanisms for selecting among suppliers with
multiple attributes include a two-stage sourcing process (TSP)
and performance-based contracting (PBC). In a TSP, the first
stage is the qualification stage, in which the potential suppliers are screened for various nonprice capabilities. The second
stage is the supplier selection stage, in which the qualified suppliers are invited to compete in a price-only procurement auction [7], [8]. Under PBC, the suppliers participate in a priceonly reverse auction. After the contract is awarded, the winning supplier is assessed a penalty (or reward) based on his
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realized performance. PBC is useful when the suppliers’ nonprice attributes are unknown to the buyer at the time of bidding [9]. PBC is also referred to as a fixed price auction with
incentives [10].
Given the growth in the use of procurement auctions, there
has been significant interest in comparing the performance of
these alternative approaches, both theoretically and empirically.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. [4] compare RFQ (or PB auctions)
with RFP (or BD auctions) and find that the buyer’s choice
will depend on the number of potential suppliers, as well as the
correlation between the cost and the nonprice attribute. Chang
[9] uses behavioral experiments to compare PBC, PB auctions,
and TSP and finds that PBC provides a higher surplus to the
buyer.
B. Problem Statement and Related Literature
We study a manufacturer who outsources the production of a
product to competing suppliers, who differ in their cost structures, as well as in their capabilities for producing high-quality
products. The manufacturer has imperfect information regarding
the suppliers’ costs and quality capabilities. In contrast to much
of the literature, we model the suppliers’ quality endogenously,
i.e., the suppliers select their quality based on the incentives
induced by the sourcing process, as designed by the buyer, subject to their exogenously specified quality capabilities. We study
how the manufacturer can design the sourcing process to 1) ensure that the selected supplier has sufficient quality capability to
produce a high-quality product, and 2) encourage competition
among the potential suppliers in order to reduce procurement
costs. In addition, we consider how imperfect information regarding the suppliers’ quality capabilities can be incorporated
into procurement process design in practice.
We do not focus on the design of a new procurement mechanism. Instead, we compare the performance of two mechanisms
that are commonly used in practice: 1) TSP; and 2) PBC. Both
mechanisms consider the suppliers’ quality capabilities, but still
allow supplier selection to be conducted using a price-only procurement auction. In addition, both TSP and PBC are appropriate when, initially, there is uncertainty regarding the suppliers’
quality capabilities. PBC assesses the penalty/reward after the
bidding process, when the winning supplier’s quality level is
realized, while TSP involves a prebidding qualification stage in
which the buyer learns about the suppliers’ quality capabilities.
Despite the similarities between TSP and PBC, there are some
differences.
1) TSP has been more widely used, including in defense procurement [11], as well as in the telecommunications [7],
[8], pharmaceutical [12], and automotive [13] industries.
On the other hand, PBC is commonly used in federal and
state government procurement [9], [10].
2) Previous literature [7], [8] has demonstrated that TSP has
a significant limitation: because supplier selection is based
only on price, TSP provides no incentive for the suppliers
to offer quality levels beyond the manufacturer’s specification. In contrast, PBC offers the suppliers a penalty/reward
based on their realized performance relative to a quality
target. Thus, if properly designed, PBC can be used to

induce the suppliers to offer quality levels that exceed the
target.
3) TSP has a qualification stage in which quality is assessed
prior to supplier selection. Under PBC, quality is evaluated after the contract is awarded, based on realized performance. This implies that any quality problems may be
discovered when it is too late to make adjustments. Thus,
poor quality product may reach the consumer, damaging
the firm’s reputation. Although the qualification process
(under TSP) and the potential for damaged reputation (under PBC) are both costly, because these costs are difficult
to quantify, we do not include them in our analysis.
4) TSP corresponds to the traditional organizational structure
of many manufacturing firms. The qualification process
(involving the production or engineering departments) is
decoupled from supplier selection (involving the procurement department). Thus, decisions regarding quality capabilities are separated from decisions regarding pricing.
In contrast, PBC requires joint decision making, i.e., the
departments must collaborate in setting an appropriate
penalty/reward rate.
Our main contribution relative to the previous work on TSP
[7], [8] is the introduction of a new model of PBC, for which
we provide analytical results, as well as a detailed sensitivity
analysis, to understand which input parameters have the most
impact on the buyer’s performance. In addition, we perform
analytical and numerical comparisons of PBC and TSP from
the perspective of the buyer and the suppliers, with the goal of
understanding why TSP is more commonly used in practice.
Chang [9] also compares TSP and PBC. However, there are a
number of differences between that work and this paper. First,
the analysis in [9] is largely empirical. In contrast, our analysis
applies analytical models, coupled with simulation. Second, [9]
takes the suppliers’ quality levels as exogenous. Our analysis
considers endogenous quality. This distinction is critical given
that PBC is a mechanism used to encourage the suppliers to offer
higher levels of quality. Finally, [9] does not link the suppliers’
unit costs to their quality levels. In contrast, in our analysis,
we assume that the suppliers’ production costs are increasing
and convex in their quality levels. Gupta and Chen [10] consider the design of incentive functions, which are analogous to
designing a PBC mechanism. However, most of their analysis
considers exogenously specified supplier quality, they do not
consider limited supplier capabilities, and they do not compare
the performance of PBC and TSP.
There has been previous work comparing PB and BD mechanisms [4], [14]. Our research has some similarities to this previous work. The TSP is similar to a PB mechanism, since while
PBC is similar to a BD mechanism. However, our work differs from this previous work by assuming endogenous supplier
quality.
There has been some previous work on procurement auctions with endogenous quality. For example, Branco [15] and
Che [16] consider multiattribute procurement auctions with endogenous quality and derive the optimal score function for the
buyer. However, our model differs from this previous work
in that the suppliers choose their quality levels subject to
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exogenously specified and heterogeneous quality capabilities,
which significantly complicates the analysis.
Our work also differs from much of the previous literature by
considering a more complex, but more realistic, cost structure
for the suppliers. Much of the literature on auctions with quality
considerations assumes the suppliers’ unit costs are independent
of their quality level [2], [9], [14]. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.
[4] allow for a correlation between the suppliers’ costs and
qualities. However, the relationship between cost and quality
is assumed to be linear. In contrast, our unit production cost is
increasing and convex in quality.
C. Contributions and Managerial Insights
This research extends the literature on sourcing process design to compare the performance of two mechanisms that are
appropriate when the buyer has uncertainty regarding the suppliers’ quality capabilities: TSP and PBC. We do so using a
model that captures several complexities not considered in the
existing literature. In particular, we assume the suppliers endogenously determine their quality levels, in response to the
sourcing process design, subject to exogenously specified heterogeneous quality capabilities, which are (initially) unknown
to the buyer. In addition, we explicitly model how the suppliers’
unit production costs vary as a function of their endogenous
quality levels using a heterogeneous production cost function
that is increasing and convex in quality. Our models allow us to
compare the performance of TSP and PBC to determine conditions under which each is preferred by the buyer. While, as
will be seen, PBC outperforms TSP from the perspective of
the buyer, TSP is much more widely used in practice, for the
reasons outlined in Section I-B. Thus, our analysis focuses on
understanding the magnitude of the performance gap between
TSP and PBC and identifying conditions under which using
PBC provides the most value to the buyer, relative to TSP.
We find that PBC is most beneficial for buyers who faces
significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers’ costs, and for
whom maintaining a high level of quality is critical. We also
find that the final delivered quality is generally higher under
PBC than under TSP and that the gap between the quality levels
is largest when there is more uncertainty regarding the potential
suppliers’ costs and when the number of potential suppliers and
the unit warranty cost are small. Given that the buyer prefers
PBC to TSP, we also provide guidance regarding how the buyer
should set the penalty/reward rate under PBC. We find that the
optimal rate is always less than the unit warranty cost and that the
optimal rate is largest when the number of potential suppliers
and the unit warranty cost are large. Finally, while the buyer
always prefers PBC, the winning supplier is generally better-off
under TSP. The supplier’s preference for TSP is strongest when
the number of suppliers is large, the uncertainty in the suppliers’
costs is small, and the unit warranty cost is large.
II. TSP AND PBC: MODELS AND COMPARISON
We consider a buyer (she) who sells a commodity-like item to
consumers at a fixed price. The buyer can purchase the item from
any of n potential suppliers (he, denoted by i = 1, . . . , n), who
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TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATION
n
Q
m (Q )
C w (q )
w
C p (Q )
CB
H (q i ; Q )
h
pi
qi
q imax
f q (·)
q̂ i (h)
q i∗ (h)
E [q ∗ ]
ci
c( i )
z
C S i (q i )
π i , π S∗
CT

Number of potential suppliers, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n .
Quality threshold under TSP and PBC, a decision variable for the buyer.
Number of qualified suppliers under TSP given threshold Q .
Buyer’s quality cost function (cost of a single unit of product with
quality level q ).
Unit warranty cost in a linear quality cost function, i.e.,
C w (q ) = w (1 − q ).
Buyer’s unit procurement cost under TSP given qualification threshold
Q.
Buyer’s total cost function.
Penalty/reward function used by buyer under PBC,
H (q i ; Q ) = h(q i − Q ).
Penalty/reward rate under PBC.
Supplier i’s bidding price, a decision variable for supplier i.
Supplier i’s quality level, a decision variable for supplier i, where
0 ≤ q i ≤ 1.
Maximum achievable quality level of supplier i, q imax ∼
Uniform(q L , q H ), q H ≤ 1.
Probability density function for q imax .
Supplier i’s optimal unconstrained quality level under PBC given h.
Supplier i’s optimal constrained quality level under PBC given h,
q i∗ (h) = m in{q̂ i , q imax }.
Expected delivered quality by the winning supplier under PBC.
Unit production cost for supplier i to produce a unit with q i = 1, c i ∼
Uniform(c L , c H ).
ith smallest value in a random sample of size n from the distribution of
ci .
Constant parameter in the suppliers’ production cost function, c i q iz .
Supplier i’s quality-related costs under PBC,
C S i (q i ) = c i q iz − H (q i ; Q ).
Supplier i’s profit, the winning supplier’s optimal profit.
Total system cost, C T = C B − π S .

differ in their capabilities for producing high-quality products, as
well as in their production costs. The buyer has chosen to singlesource and will select a single supplier from the set of potential
suppliers. We normalize the buyer’s volume (which is fixed and
known) to 1. The buyer cares about both procurement cost (price
charged by the supplier) and the quality of the product. We let
pi and qi denote supplier i’s bid price and offered quality. Both
pi and qi are decision variables for supplier i.
We model quality, qi , as the probability that a randomly
selected unit of supplier i’s product is not defective. Thus,
qi ∈ [0, 1], with qi = 1 representing perfect quality. The use
of the defective rate (or, equivalently, the conformance rate) to
represent product quality is fairly common in the literature [17],
[18]. We assume that supplier i’s unit production cost is ci qiz ,
where z > 1 is a constant, and ci can be thought of as supplier
i’s cost to produce a unit of perfect quality. This cost function is
increasing and convex, which implies that the marginal cost of a
unit of quality is increasing in the quality level, i.e., higher levels
of quality are increasingly costly to obtain. A larger value of z
implies more curvature in the cost function, with z = 1 implying a linear cost in quality. A convex cost function is commonly
used in the literature, e.g., the unit production cost function in
[19] takes this form. The ci are assumed to vary across the suppliers. In order to obtain closed-form results, we assume the
ci are independent draws from a uniform[cL , cH ] distribution,
where cL > 0. We will use c(i) to denote the order statistics for
the ci , so that c(1) ≤ c(2) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n ) . See Table I for a list of
notation.
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The suppliers have differing capabilities for producing highquality products. Specifically, let qimax denote supplier i’s quality
capability, i.e., supplier i’s maximum achievable quality level.
Thus, supplier i’s decision problem includes the constraint qi ≤
qimax . In practice, this capability will depend on various factors,
including the supplier’s experience, access to skilled labor and
access to technology. We assume the qimax are independent draws
from a uniform[qL , qH ] distribution, where qH ≤ 1.
The buyer designs the sourcing process to minimize the unit
cost, including the procurement cost (i.e., the winning bid price),
the costs associated with poor quality and, in the case of PBC, the
penalty/reward payments made to the winning supplier. While
more complex models are possible [7], [8], for simplicity, we
model the buyer’s cost of poor quality as the expected unit warranty cost, which can be written as Cw (q) = w(1 − q), where
1 − q is the probability a randomly selected unit is defective,
and w is the warranty cost associated with a single defective
unit. Finally, we assume that each supplier will choose the quality level and bid price in order to maximize his expected unit
profit, which includes the unit production cost, revenue from
sales to the buyer (winning bid price), and, in the case of PBC,
the penalty/reward payments made to the buyer.
A. TSP
We first consider a TSP, commonly used in industrial and
government procurement. In the qualification stage, potential
suppliers are screened for a variety of capabilities, including
quality and reliability. In the supplier selection stage, the qualified suppliers are invited to compete for the buyer’s business
by participating in a sealed-bid (closed) price-only procurement
auction. Thus, each stage has a fundamentally different objective. The qualification stage ensures that the buyer sources from
only the most capable suppliers, while the supplier selection
stage induces competition between the potential suppliers. Jin
et al. [8] present a model of a TSP in which the buyer exerts
effort in the qualification stage in order to learn about the suppliers’ quality capabilities. We present only the simplest model
in their paper, in which the qualification process is costless and
provides the buyer with perfect information on the suppliers’
capabilities.1 This simplest model is the most favorable version of TSP, and thus offers the most favorable comparison
with PBC.
In the qualification stage, the buyer specifies the qualification
threshold, Q, which suppliers must meet in order to participate
in the supplier selection stage, i.e., only suppliers with qimax ≥ Q
are invited to participate in price-only bidding. After the qualification stage, some number, m(Q) ≤ n, of the potential suppliers
will be qualified. Note that m(Q) is a random variable which depends on Q and on the distribution of the qimax . These m(Q) qualified suppliers will submit sealed price-only bids to the buyer,
who will select among them on the basis of price. Using standard results from auction theory [20], the expected winning bid
price, which is the buyer’s expected unit procurement cost, can
1 Here, we do not include a detailed analysis of the TSP model with non-fully

capable suppliers because that analysis has been published in previous papers
[7], [8].

m (Q )−1
be written as Cp (Q) = Qz E[cH × m (Q2)+1 + cL × m
(Q )+1 ].
This result uses the fact that all of the qualified suppliers will set
their quality just equal to the qualification threshold, Q, since
they have no incentive to offer a higher level of quality. Thus,
the buyer’s problem is to choose Q to minimize her total cost,
CB (Q) = Cp (Q) + Cw (Q). Jin et al. [7], [8] show that the opd˜C
w
timal threshold satisfies d˜Qp = d˜C
d˜Q = w, i.e., at the optimal
Q, the marginal increase in procurement costs due to an increase
in Q just equals the marginal savings in warranty costs due to
an increase in Q.
Although Jin et al. [7], [8] assume a closed auction, i.e.,
sealed bids, their results also hold under an open auction, due
to revenue equivalence (see, for example, [20]). We can thus
rewrite the results for the special case in which the suppliers have unlimited quality capabilities, and z = 2, as follows:
the qualification threshold is Q∗ = 2E [cw( 2 ) ] , the buyer’s cost

is CB∗ = w −
earns

πS∗

w ∗
2Q
∗ 2

=w−

1
w2
4 E [c ( 2 ) ] ,

and the winning supplier

= (Q ) (E[c(2) ] − E[c(1) ]).

B. PBC
Under the TSP, the qualified suppliers compete only on the
basis of price. Thus, they have no incentive to offer a quality
level greater than the qualification threshold, Q. In constrast, under PBC, the buyer offers the suppliers a penalty/reward based
on the winning supplier’s realized quality, relative to the target
quality, Q. Thus, a properly designed penalty/reward function
may encourage the suppliers to offer quality levels greater than
Q. Another benefit of PBC is the potential for increased competition, relative to TSP. Under TSP only the m(Q) ≤ n qualified
suppliers may participate in the supplier selection stage. In contrast, under PBC, all n potential suppliers are allowed to bid.2
Under PBC, the buyer declares that the winning supplier’s
payment will include a penalty/reward, denoted by H(qi ; Q),
where Q is the buyer’s target quality level. If qi > Q, then
H(qi ; Q) > 0 represents a reward paid to the supplier; if qi < Q,
then H(qi ; Q) < 0 represents a penalty charged to the supplier.
Thus, supplier i’s profit, given that he wins the buyer’s business,
is πi = pi − ci qiz + H(qi ; Q). The buyer will select among the
n potential suppliers by running a price-only procurement auction. We assume no cost for bidding and thus all n potential
suppliers participate in the auction. Supplier i will bid in order to maximize his expected unit profit, subject to qi ≤ qimax
and pi ≥ ci qiz − H(qi ; Q). Since we assume price-only bidding, the probability that supplier i wins is decreasing as pi
increases. Thus, the best qi will be the value that minimizes supplier i’s total unit quality-related costs, denoted by CSi , where
CSi (qi ) = ci qiz − H(qi ; Q). We let q̂i denote that value of qi
that minimizes CSi (qi ). However, supplier i is constrained by
his maximum achievable quality level, qimax . Thus, supplier i
will set his quality level equal to qi∗ = min{q̂i , qimax }.

2 Of course, there are some settings in which it would not be feasible to allow
all n suppliers to bid, regardless of their quality capabilities, e.g., settings in
which there is a hard minimum on the quality level that must be achieved. In
such a setting, a pure PBC approach would not be appropriate.
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While alternative forms for the penalty/reward function are
possible, we will focus on a symmetric and linear function,
H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), where h is the penalty/reward rate,
which is a decision variable for the buyer. In this case, we can
1
solve ∂∂CqSi i = 0 to find q̂i = ( zhc i ) z −1 . When z = 2, q̂i = 2ch i .
As noted in [10], linear incentive functions are commonly used
in practice. In Section V, we will demonstrate that the buyer
does not see a significant increase in expected cost if she uses a
symmetric function.
Before analyzing PBC in detail, we argue that revenue equivalence applies, and thus the buyer’s results for open and closed
bidding will be identical. The costs ci for producing one unit of
perfect quality and the quality capabilities qimax are independent
across all suppliers. The optimal quality level for supplier i, qi∗ ,
1
is equal to min{( zhc i ) z −1 , qimax }. The suppliers’ optimal costs,
∗
∗ z
i.e., CSi (qi ) = ci (qi ) − h(qi∗ − Q) for i = 1, . . . , n, are thus
functions of ci and qimax . For a given h, these optimal costs are
independent across the suppliers. In addition, the costs follow
identical distributions since ci and qimax are drawn from identical distributions. Thus, the auction has a set of bidders with
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) costs. Following the revenue equivalence result for forward auctions [20],
for reverse auctions, all standard auction forms, including open
auctions and first-price closed auctions, with i.i.d. costs, will
yield the same expected cost for the buyer.
C. Comparison of PBC and TSP
The goal of this work is to compare the performance of the
TSP and PBC mechanisms. We would like to do so from three
perspectives: those of the buyer, the suppliers, and the system
as a whole. It is straightforward to argue that PBC with a general penalty/reward function always outperforms TSP. To do
so, one can argue that the penalty/reward function under PBC
can always be designed to achieve the results of TSP with a
specified threshold, Q. Specifically, the buyer can design the
penalty/reward function such that if a supplier’s quality capability is at least equal to Q, then there is no penalty; otherwise, an
infinite penalty is assigned. Given this penalty/reward function,
only those suppliers with quality capability above the threshold
Q would participate in the auction, and the winning supplier
would always set his quality equal to Q, thus replicating the
TSP outcome.
While PBC with a general penalty/reward function, such as
an asymmetric linear function, will always perform at least as
well as the TSP, from the buyer’s perspective, it is not clear
how the more practical and easy-to-implement symmetric linear
penalty/reward function will perform relative to the TSP since
the above argument does not apply for the symmetric case.
Thus, we next prove that PBC, with a symmetric penalty/reward
rate, h, selected to minimize the buyer’s expected cost, always
outperforms the TSP, with qualification threshold, Q, selected to
minimize the buyer’s expected cost, from the perspective of the
buyer. The proofs of all theorems can be found in the technical
supplement.
Theorem 1: Consider a setting in which the potential suppliers have limited quality capabilities, i.e., supplier i must
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satisfy qi ≤ qimax , where qimax ≤ 1 for all i. The buyer’s expected cost under PBC, with a symmetric penalty/reward function, H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), in which the penalty/reward rate,
h, is set optimally, is no greater than the buyer’s expected cost
under the TSP, in which the qualification threshold, Q, is set
optimally.
From the buyer’s perspective, PBC will always outperform
TSP, i.e., PBC will provide a lower expected cost. From the
proof of Theorem 1, there are two factors contributing to this
result. First, the suppliers’ quality levels are endogenous and
PBC provides a greater degree of flexibility to the suppliers in
choosing their quality levels. Under TSP, the suppliers must set
their quality levels at least equal to the qualification threshold
Q. Since the suppliers’ expected costs are increasing in Q under
TSP, all qualified suppliers will choose to set their quality levels
equal to exactly Q. Under PBC, although the penalty/reward
function specifies a target quality level Q the suppliers are able
to choose their optimal quality level, i.e., the quality level that
minimizes their costs, subject to their quality capabilities. This
flexibility implies that each supplier may offer a different quality
level, i.e., the suppliers will offer differentiated quality levels to
the buyer. Second, PBC allows all n potential suppliers to bid in
the auction. On the other hand, under TSP, only the m(Q) ≤ n
qualified suppliers, i.e., the suppliers with qimax ≥ Q, are allowed
to bid in the auction stage. Thus, there is less competition in the
bidding stage under TSP than under PBC, leading to a higher
winning bid price for the buyer.
III. PBC: DETAILED ANALYSIS
We next perform a more detailed analysis of the buyer’s decisions under PBC. Supplier i will set his optimal quality level,
qi∗ , to minimize CSi (qi ), subject to qi ≤ qimax . One of the main
goals of this research is to study a setting in which the suppliers
set their quality levels endogenously, based on the incentives
provided by the buyer, but subject to heterogeneous quality capabilities. Thus, in Section III-A, we consider a setting in which
the suppliers do not have unlimited quality capabilities, which
implies qi∗ = min{q̂i , qimax } for all i. Then, to derive additional
results, in Section III-B, we consider the case in which all suppliers have unlimited quality capability and thus qi∗ = q̂i , for
all i.
A. Suppliers are Not Fully Capable
To model the suppliers’ heterogeneous quality capabilities, we assume the qimax are independent draws from a
uniform[qL , qH ] distribution for i = 1, . . . , n, where qH ≤ 1
(and thus qimax ≤ 1 for all i). In this case, assuming a symmetric and linear penalty/reward function, H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q),
with penalty/reward rate h, and z > 1, supplier i’s optimal qual1
ity level is qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i (h), qimax }, where q̂i (h) = ( zhc i ) z −1 .
When bidding in a price-only auction, supplier i will bid based
on his optimal cost
∗
CSi
(h) = ci (qi∗ (h))z − H(qi∗ (h); Q)

= ci (qi∗ (h))z − h(qi∗ (h) − Q).

(1)
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For this model, determining the winning supplier and the expected winning bid price, and characterizing the buyer’s optimal
penalty/reward rate, are challenging. As will be seen, in the case
of fully capable suppliers (with qi∗ (h) = q̂i (h) for all i), supplier
i’s total cost, CSi (q̂i (h)), is decreasing in ci , and thus the supplier with the lowest unit cost wins the bidding. However, this
result does not hold when the suppliers are not fully capable.
Instead, the winning supplier will be the one with the lowest
∗
(h), which depends in a complex manner on both ci and
CSi
max
qi , as well as h.
To characterize the suppliers’ bid prices, we need to find the
∗
(h), noting that since the ci and
probability distribution of CSi
max
∗
qi are i.i.d., the CSi (h) will also be i.i.d. Let FC (·) denote the
∗
(h). Furthermore, to characterize the buyer’s expected
cdf CSi
∗
(h). Under
cost, we must characterize the order statistics of CSi
open bidding, the buyer will choose the supplier with the lowest
∗
(h), and will pay a bid price equal to
unit cost, i.e., the lowest CSi
∗
(h). Consider a setting with just
the second lowest value of CSi
two suppliers, labeled as i and j. Suppose that supplier i wins
∗
(h) ≤ CS∗ j (h). The buyer’s
the bidding. This implies that CSi
total cost is
CB (Q, h) = CS∗ j (h) + w(1 − qi∗ (h)) + h(qi∗ (h) − Q)
= cj qj∗ (h)z − h(qj∗ (h) − qi∗ (h)) + w(1 − qi∗ (h)).

(2)

Note that the Q cancels out of the buyer’s cost function.
Hence, for the remainder of this section, we will write the buyer’s
cost as CB (h). We can now state the following result.
Theorem 2: Consider PBC with a symmetric penalty/reward
function, H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), when the suppliers are not all
fully capable, i.e., when qimax ≤ 1 for all i, with z > 1.
∗
(h) ≤ CS∗ j (h), then E[qi∗ (h)] ≥ E[qj∗ (h)],
1) Given CSi
max
E[qi ] ≥ E[qjmax ] and E[ci ] ≤ E[cj ].
This theorem holds for any pair of suppliers i and j not
just those with the lowest and second lowest total unit cost.
The theorem states that if supplier i provides the buyer with a
∗
(h) ≤ CS∗ j (h)), then the
lower total unit cost than supplier j (CSi
expected quality from supplier i must be no less than that from
supplier j (E[qi∗ (h)] ≥ E[qj∗ (h)]). Thus, the theorem implies
that, for any h, the supplier who wins the bidding based on
∗
(h) for i = 1, . . . , n, will also provide the highest
the costs CSi
expected level of delivered quality. The final two results of the
theorem imply that, in expectation, the auction process favors
suppliers with higher quality capability and lower unit costs.
1) Optimal Penalty/Reward Rate: We would like to characterize the optimal penalty/reward rate, h. In order to understand
the impact of h on which supplier wins the bidding, it is useful
to consider two extreme cases.
1) When h → ∞, qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i , qimax } = qimax and thus
∗
∗
= ci (qimax )z − h(qimax − Q). In this case, CSi
is domCSi
max
inated by the term −h(qi − Q). The impact of ci is
negligible. Therefore, the supplier with the highest qimax
will win the auction. Thus, the expected delivered quality
is equal to the expected highest qimax among n random
1
n
qL + n +1
qH . Since the impact of ci
draws, which is n +1
is negligible, and since ci is independent of qimax , a supplier
with any ci has an equal chance of winning the auction.

Thus, the expected unit cost of the winning supplier is
c L +c H
.
2
1
2) When h → 0, qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i , qimax } = q̂i = ( zhc i ) z −1

∗
and CSi
= hQ − (1 − z1 )(h) z −1 ( z1c i ) z −1 . In this case,
∗
CSi is an increasing function of ci . Therefore, the supplier
with the lowest ci will win the auction and the expected
n
1
cL + n +1
cH .
unit cost of the winning supplier will be n +1
max
Because ci is independent of qi , a supplier with any qimax
has an equal chance of winning the auction. Thus, the exH
.
pected delivered quality level is q L +q
2
Intuitively, when h = 0, the lowest unit cost supplier wins. As
h increases away from 0, suppliers with higher unit cost starts
to have a chance of winning the auction, if they happen to have
a high-quality capability. Finally, when h becomes sufficiently
large, the most capable supplier wins.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal penalty/reward
rate for the buyer.
Theorem 3: Under PBC, with a symmetric penalty/reward
function, H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), when the suppliers are not all
fully capable, i.e., when qimax ≤ 1 for all i, with z > 1, the
optimal penalty/reward rate h∗ satisfies h∗ ≤ w, where w is the
unit warranty cost.
The theorem implies that the buyer does not share all of her
warranty costs with the winning supplier. Instead, it is optimal
for the buyer to absorb some of the warranty costs. To understand
this result, note that Theorem 2 indicates that the auction process
will favor suppliers who have lower unit costs and those who can
provide a higher level of delivered quality. Thus, although a high
penalty/reward rate h can be used to encourage the supplier’s
to offer a high level of quality, it is not the only mechanism for
doing so. Finally, we note that this result is consistent with the
findings in [10], although the assumptions and model settings
have a number of differences.
2) Evaluating the Buyer’s Cost: While Theorem 3 presents
general results regarding the magnitude of the optimal
penalty/reward rate h providing an exact expression is more
challenging. In fact, even deriving a useful closed-form expression for the buyer’s expected cost is difficult. From
(2), we can write the buyer’s expected cost as CB (Q, h) =
∗
(h)] − hQ, where we use the
E[CS∗ [2] (h)] + w + (h − w)E[q[1]
∗
subscript [i] to denote the order statistics for the CSi
(h),
∗
∗
∗
∗
so that CS [1] (h) ≤ CS [2] (h) ≤ · · · ≤ CS [n ] (h), and CS [2] (h) =
∗ z
∗
c[2] (q[2]
) − hq[2]
+ hQ. The expected profit for the winning
supplier, i.e., supplier [1], will then be
z

1

πS (h) = E[CS∗ [2] (h)] − E[CS∗ [1] (h)].

(3)

To evaluate the buyer’s expected cost, we need to evaluate
∗
(h)] and E[CS∗ [2] (h)]. To do so, for simplicity, we will
E[q[1]
focus on the case in which qL ≤ q̂i (h) ≤ qH for all i, where
1
q̂i (h) = ( zhc i ) z −1 . For a given ci , using the fact that qi∗ (h) =
max
min{q̂i (h), qi }, we have
 q̂ i (h)
∗
max
Eq i [qi (h)|ci ] =
qimax fq (qimax )dqimax
qL



qH

+
q̂ i (h)

q̂i (h)fq (qimax )dqimax

(4)
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where fq (qimax ) denotes the density function for qimax , defined on
[qL , qH ]. From (1), using qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i (h), qimax }, we have
Eq imax [CS∗ i (h)|ci ] =


qH

+
q̂ i (h )





q̂ i (h )

TABLE II
PBC SOLUTION FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF n

(ci (qimax )2 − hqimax + hQ)fq (qimax )dqimax

qL



1
hQ − 1 −
z


(h)

z
z −1



1
zci

1 
 z −1

fq (qimax )dqimax .
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n
n
n
n

=
=
=
=

5
10
15
20

C B∗

E [q ∗ ]

h∗

CT

π S∗

(w − h)/h

1.004
0.900
0.845
0.810

0.442
0.510
0.546
0.568

1.096
1.130
1.149
1.157

0.915
0.823
0.777
0.749

0.088
0.077
0.068
0.062

46.1%
42.5%
39.7%
39.4%

(5)

We can now write the buyer’s expected cost as
CB (Q, h) = Ec [ 2 ] {E
+ (h −
∗
[CSi
(h)|c[2] ]

q imax

∗
[CSi
(h)|c[2] ]}

+w

w)Ec [ 1 ] {Eq imax [qi∗ |c[1] ]}
[qi∗ |c[1] ]

TABLE III
PBC SOLUTION FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF w

− hQ

(6)

and E
are computed using
where E
(5) and (4), respectively.
We next present the results of an extensive numerical study to
demonstrate the behavior of the optimal penalty/reward rate, as
well as the buyer’s expected cost. In Section III-B, we consider
the case in which all suppliers are fully capable, which allows
for closed-form results and additional insights.
3) Numerical Results: We fix z = 2, so that the unit production cost is quadratic in quality. We have six problem parameters
to consider (cL , cH , qL , qH , w, and n). We set qH = 1 and the
H
average unit cost to c L +c
= 2. We write cL = 2 − δ and cH =
2
2 + δ. Thus, we have four parameters to vary (qL , δ, w, and n).
For each, we consider four values: qL ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, δ ∈
{0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, w ∈ {0.25, 1, 2, 3}, and n ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}, resulting in a total of 256 experiments. To set the range for the
unit warranty cost w we considered that in our experiments the
average unit cost is equal to 2. Thus, we include cases in which
the unit warranty cost is substantially less than the average unit
cost, as well as cases in which the unit warranty cost exceeds
the average unit cost. In the latter case, the unit warranty cost
includes a goodwill cost, i.e., a cost of customer dissatisfaction
due to the low quality of the product.
We next describe how we evaluate the buyer’s cost for a
given penalty/reward rate h and search for the optimal h. We
first generate two sets of one million random numbers from a
uniform[0, 1] distribution. For each combination of the parameters (cL , cH , qL , qH , w, n), we use the first set to generate a set
of one million ci ∈ [cL , cH ] and the second set to generate a
set of one million qimax ∈ [qL , qH ]. For a given h, we find the
optimal quality qi∗ = min{q̂i (h), qimax } for each i and compute
∗
(h) = ci (qi∗ )2 − h(qi∗ − Q) for each i. We
the overall cost CSi
then repeat the following process 5000 times.
1) Generate a set of indexes (integers) from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 million. The size of the set is the
number of suppliers, n.
∗
(h) and
2) Use the indexes to extract the corresponding CSi
rank these costs in ascending order.
3) Find the winning supplier (the supplier with the lowest
∗
(h)) and the winning bid price (the second lowest
CSi
∗
(h)).
CSi
4) Record the buyer’s total cost, the delivered quality and the
winning bid price.
After 5000 repetitions, we compute the average of the winning
supplier’s total cost, the delivered quality and the winning bid
q imax

q imax

w
w
w
w

=
=
=
=

0.25
1
2
3

C B∗

E [q ∗ ]

h∗

CT

π S∗

(w − h)/h

0.227
0.737
1.164
1.432

0.166
0.452
0.671
0.778

0.197
0.776
1.476
2.083

0.221
0.696
1.065
1.282

0.005
0.041
0.098
0.150

35.0%
37.5%
43.9%
51.3%

TABLE IV
PBC SOLUTION FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF qL

qL
qL
qL
qL

=
=
=
=

0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7

C B∗

E [q ∗ ]

h∗

CT

π S∗

(w − h)/h

0.943
0.908
0.872
0.836

0.477
0.501
0.529
0.560

1.114
1.127
1.141
1.151

0.869
0.836
0.800
0.760

0.074
0.072
0.072
0.076

43.0%
42.9%
41.3%
40.4%

TABLE V
PBC SOLUTION FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF δ = cH − cL

δ
δ
δ
δ

=
=
=
=

1
2
3
4

C B∗

E [q ∗ ]

h∗

CT

π S∗

(w − h)/h

1.057
0.963
0.843
0.696

0.431
0.482
0.540
0.614

1.438
1.267
1.050
0.777

1.030
0.908
0.756
0.570

0.027
0.055
0.088
0.126

7.3%
19.1%
40.3%
100.9%

price. From these values, we compute the buyer’s cost and the
total system cost. Finally, we need to find the h to minimize the
buyer’s cost. According to Theorem 3, h∗ ≤ w. Thus, we search
for the optimal h over the range [0.1, 3] with an increment of
0.01.
Tables II–V show the impact of the parameters on the performance measures, including the buyer’s optimal cost CB∗ , the
winning supplier’s expected profit πS∗ , the expected total system cost, denoted by CT = CB∗ − πS∗ , the expected quality level
provided by the winning supplier (referred to as the “expected
delivered quality level”) E[q ∗ ], and the optimal penalty/reward
rate h∗ . Although the results in the tables are obtained using
simulation, we expect them to be quite accurate. Specifically,
for each of the 256 experiments, for each performance measure, we computed the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean (across the 5000 replications). For the buyer’s expected
cost (system cost), the average value of this ratio across the 256
experiments was 0.0017 (0.0024), while the maximum value
across the 256 experiments was 0.0055 (0.0081). Tables II–V
show the impact of one parameter. Each row shows the average
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value of the performance measures across the 64 experiments
in which the parameter took the specified value.
Table II shows the impact of the number of potential suppliers
on the results. These results reflect the benefit of increased competition (larger n) for the buyer. With more potential suppliers,
the competition is more intense, resulting the lower cost for the
buyer and lower profit for the winning supplier. The buyer is also
able to set a higher penalty/reward rate, effectively passing on
more of the warranty cost to the winning supplier, and resulting
in a higher expected delivered quality.
Table III shows the impact of the unit warranty cost. As w
increases, CB∗ increases, E[q ∗ ] increases, CT increases, πS∗ increases, h∗ increases, and (w − h)/h increases. The impact of
the unit warranty cost on the buyer’s cost, the penalty/reward
rate and the delivered quality are intuitive. With a higher unit
warranty cost, the buyer must set a higher penalty/reward rate
in order to induce a higher delivered quality, leading to a higher
expected cost for the buyer. A higher unit warranty cost is beneficial for the winning supplier, i.e., results in a higher expected
profit. The winning supplier’s profit, as shown in (3), is equal
to the difference between the costs of the second lowest and
lowest cost suppliers. This difference is increasing in h, i.e.,
a larger h magnifies any differences between the suppliers’ ci
and qimax . Since the buyer sets a higher penalty/reward rate as
the warranty cost increases, the difference between the second
lowest and lowest suppliers’ costs increases as the warranty cost
increases, implying that the winning supplier’s profit increases.
Thus, the information rent earned by the winning supplier increases with the warranty cost, reflecting the increased power
of the suppliers.
Table IV shows the impact of the lower bound on the suppliers’ quality capabilities on the results. As qL increases, CB∗
decreases, E[q ∗ ] increases, the expected system cost decreases,
πS∗ increases, h∗ increases, and (w − h)/h decreases. In our
numerical examples, we fix the upper bound on the suppliers’
quality capabilities to qH = 1. Thus, an increase in qL implies
an increase in the average quality level across the suppliers.
This increase leads to a higher expected delivered quality for
the buyer and thus reduces the buyer’s expected cost, as well as
the expected system cost. However, the impact of a larger qL on
the winning supplier’s expected profit is mixed. On one hand, an
increase in the average quality level across the suppliers leads to
an increase in the expected quality capability of the winning supplier, which should benefit the winning supplier. On the other
hand, a larger qL implies that the range (qH − qL ) of quality
levels across the set of suppliers is smaller, i.e., there is less differentiation between the potential suppliers, while the number of
suppliers competing for the buyer’s business is fixed at n. Thus,
as qL increases, the difference between CS∗ [2] (h) and CS∗ [1] (h)
decreases, implying that the winning supplier’s expected profit,
as given in (3), decreases. In other words, less differentiation
(tighter competition) between the suppliers results in a lower expected profit for the winning supplier. Overall, considering both
factors, qL has little impact on the winning supplier’s expected
profit.
Table V shows the impact of the spread in the suppliers’ unit
costs (δ = cH − cL ) on the results. As cH − cL increases, CB∗

decreases, E[q ∗ ] increases, the expected system cost decreases,
πS∗ increases, h∗ decreases, and (w − h)/h increases. As we
L
) is kept
vary the spread (cH − cL ), the average cost ( c H +c
2
constant. Thus, when the spread is increased, the suppliers’
costs can take lower (and higher) values. Due to the competition
induced by the auction, as well as the fact that the auction process
favors lower cost suppliers, the buyer is able to take advantage
of the lower costs, without feeling the impact of the higher costs,
resulting in a lower overall cost for the buyer and allowing the
buyer to achieve a higher expected delivered quality level. The
larger spread (cH − cL ) also benefits the winning supplier. As
noted above, the winning supplier’s expected profit is equal to
CS∗ [2] (h) − CS∗ [1] (h), which should be increasing in cH − cL .
In other words, greater differentiation between the suppliers
(larger cH − cL ) implies less competition and higher profits for
the winning supplier.
While Tables II–V show the impact of one parameter, Fig. 1
shows the joint impact of the unit warranty cost w and the spread
in the suppliers’ unit costs, δ. Fig. 1(a) confirms the results
shown in the tables, i.e., the buyer’s optimal cost is decreasing
in δ and increasing in w. However, Fig. 1(b) demonstrates an
interaction not seen in the tables. Specifically, when the unit
warranty cost is small, the expected delivered quality is much
more sensitive to the spread in the suppliers’ costs than when
the unit warranty cost is large. As explained in the previous
paragraph, larger δ will generally lead to larger E[q ∗ ]. However,
when the unit warranty cost is large, this effect is minimal, since
the expected delivered quality will already be quite large due
to the large penalty/reward rate induced by the high warranty
cost. Finally, while not shown here, we also created additional
two-way graphs, for different combinations of input parameters.
All of these graphs are similar to Fig. 1(a), i.e., they confirm the
results in Tables II–V without demonstrating any interactions
between the parameters.
B. All Suppliers are Fully Capable
To obtain further analytical results, we consider the case in
which all suppliers are fully capable, i.e., qimax = 1 for all i,
with z = 2. When the suppliers are all fully capable, given the
penalty/reward rate equal to h, supplier i will set his quality level
equal to qi∗ (h) = q̂i (h) = 2ch i . Depending on the value of h, we
may have q̂i (h) > 1. Given our interpretation of quality (i.e.,
the probability that a randomly selected unit is not defective),
we should define qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i (h), 1}. However, the goal of
this section is to enable analytical results for PBC. Thus, while
we will discuss the case in which qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i (h), 1} at
the end of this section, for simplicity, we will write qi∗ (h) =
∗
(h) =
q̂i (h) = 2ch i . Given qi∗ (h), supplier i’s optimal cost is CSi
h
). When bidding in the
CSi (qi∗ (h)) = Csi (q̂i (h)) = hQ − ( 4c
i
∗
(h). Since
price-only auction, supplier i will bid based on CSi
∗
the ci are i.i.d., the CSi (h) will also be i.i.d.
The suppliers participate in an open auction. Recall that the
∗
(h) and will
buyer will select the supplier with the lowest CSi
∗
pay a bid price equal to the second lowest CSi (h). From the
∗
(h), it is clear that the supplier with the lowest
expression for CSi
∗
(h). Thus, the
ci will also be the supplier with the lowest CSi
2
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Fig. 1.
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Impact of δ and w on buyer’s expected cost and expected delivered quality. (a) The buyer’s expected cost. (b) The expected delivered quality level.

∗
] is
cost, w. The optimal expected delivered quality level E[q(1)
increasing in the unit warranty cost w.
h2
h
∗
This theorem provides the following insights.
4c ( 2 ) and the quality level equal to q(1) (h) = 2c ( 1 ) . The buyer’s
1) When designing PBC, the buyer must set the quality target
total expected unit cost CB (Q, h) consists of the expected unit
Q and the penalty/reward rate h. Q can take any value.
procurement cost (or expected winning bid price), the expected
However, the optimal h is always less than the unit warunit warranty cost and the expected penalty/reward payment
ranty cost w.
2) For cL > 0, as the number of potential suppliers n in∗
∗
∗
CB (Q, h) = E[p(1) (h)] + w(1 − E[q(1) ]) + h(E[q(1) (h)] − Q)
creases, it will generally hold that E[ c (12 ) ] → E[ c (11 ) ].
 2 



E[ c 1 ]
h
h
= hQ − E
+w 1−E
Thus, γ = E [ (12 ) ] → 1, which implies h∗ → w, as n →
4c(2)
2c(1)
c (1)
 


∞. In other words, the optimal penalty/reward rate h∗ aph
proaches the warranty cost w as the number of suppliers
+h E
−Q
2c(1)
increases.




3) The winning supplier will be the supplier with the low1
1
h2
h
= w− E
+ E
(h − w).
est unit cost c(1) . That supplier will provide quality level
4
c(2)
2
c(1)
∗
∗
= 2ch( 1 ) . Applying the same argument as in the previq(1)
∗
Notice that the quality threshold Q does not affect the buyer’s
ous bullet, E[q(1)
] will generally be increasing in n. Thus,
cost. Thus, the buyer’s problem is to select h to minimize CB (h).
more potential suppliers (more competition) is beneficial
We are now ready to characterize the buyer’s optimal solution.
to the buyer, leading to a higher expected delivered quality
Theorem 4: Under PBC, with a symmetric penalty/reward
level and lower expected cost.
function, H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), when all suppliers are fully
4) The expression for the winning supplier’s expected profit
capable, with z = 2, the optimal penalty/reward rate is h∗ =
πS∗ indicates that this profit should generally be decreasing
E[ c 1 ]
as the number of suppliers increases. To see this, note that
1
w( 2−γ
), where γ = E [ (12 ) ] ≤ 1 and thus 0 ≤ h∗ ≤ w.
c (1)
h∗ is approximately constant (equal to w) as n → ∞,
The optimal delivered quality level, i.e., the quality level
while E[ c (11 ) − c (12 ) ] → 0.
∗
∗
provided by the winning supplier, is E[q(1)
] = h2 E[ c (11 ) ] =
∗
5) When E[q(1)
] < 1, a larger warranty cost w leads to higher
w
1
1
∗
(
)E[
].
The
buyer’s
optimal
expected
cost
is
C
=
expected
cost
and a higher expected delivered quality level
B
2 2−γ
c( 1 )
w
∗
for
the
buyer.
However, a larger warranty cost leads to
w − 2 E[q(1) ].
∗
higher
expected
profit for the winning supplier. This imThe winning supplier earns expected profit equal to πS =
(h ∗ ) 2
plies
that
the
suppliers
gain power over the buyer when
1
1
4 E[ c ( 1 ) − c ( 2 ) ]. The total supply chain expected cost is
the
warranty
cost
is
large,
allowing the winning supplier
∗
∗
)2 + w(1 − q(1)
)].
CT = CB∗ − πS∗ = E[c(1) (q(1)
to
extract
more
profit
from
the buyer.
∂C∗
6) The expected delivered quality level under PBC, as
The buyer’s optimal expected cost satisfies ∂ wB = 1 −
∗
∗
specified in Theorem 4, is lower than in the system
]. Thus, when E[q(1)
] < 1, the buyer’s optimal expected
E[q(1)
optimal solution, which can be obtained by setting
cost is increasing in the unit warranty cost w, while the winh = w.
ning supplier’s expected profit is increasing in the unit warranty

lowest cost supplier, i.e., the supplier whose unit cost is c(1) ,
will win with a bid price equal to p∗(1) (h) = CS∗ (2) (h) = hQ −
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TABLE VI
PBC VERSUS TSP: IMPACT OF NUMBER OF POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS
% E [q ∗ ]

% CB

n
n
n
n

=
=
=
=

5
10
15
20

7.55%
9.29%
10.36%
11.07%

24.75%
17.60%
13.93%
11.49%

% π S∗

1.41%
5.75%
9.26%
12.41%

% CT

8.34%
10.39%
11.60%
12.21%

q TSP ≤
q PBC

C TTSP >
C TPBC

π STSP >
π SPBC

92.19%
93.75%
87.50%
87.50%

100.00%
100.00%
93.75%
93.75%

57.81%
65.63%
84.38%
89.06%

TABLE VII
PBC VERSUS TSP: IMPACT OF UNIT WARRANTY COST

w
w
w
w

=
=
=
=

0.25
1
2
3

% CB

% E [q ∗ ]

% π S∗

% CT

4.00%
7.37%
11.52%
15.38%

28.41%
14.23%
13.19%
11.93%

-0.56%
6.75%
8.07%
14.58%

4.96%
8.19%
12.93%
16.45%

q TSP ≤
q PBC

C TTSP >
C TPBC

π STSP >
π SPBC

76.56% 87.50%
89.06% 100.00%
95.31% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00%

57.81%
75.00%
75.00%
89.06%

TABLE VIII
PBC VERSUS TSP: IMPACT OF LOWER BOUND ON SUPPLIERS’ QUALITY
CAPABILITIES

qL
qL
qL
qL

=
=
=
=

0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7

% CB

% E [q ∗ ]

% π S∗

% CT

q TSP ≤
q PBC

C TTSP >
C TPBC

π STSP >
π SPBC

9.21%
9.84%
10.05%
9.17%

18.89%
17.33%
16.74%
14.80%

7.78%
8.48%
6.88%
5.70%

9.91%
10.67%
11.31%
10.65%

93.75%
92.19%
90.63%
84.38%

96.88%
96.88%
96.88%
96.88%

82.81%
78.13%
73.44%
62.50%

In summary, the optimal penalty/reward rate h∗ is proportional to the unit warranty cost w. Therefore, PBC with a linear penalty/reward function is a form of shared warranty costs,
where the portion of the warranty cost paid by the selected sup1
) is increasing in the number of potential suppliers.
plier ( 2−γ
Thus, when there is more competition, the winning supplier is
forced to bear a greater portion of the buyer’s warranty costs. In
addition, the optimal penalty/reward rate h∗ will generally approach w as the number of potential suppliers increases. Thus, as
the number of suppliers increases, the optimal winning quality
level increases towards the system optimal quality level.
As noted above, when qimax = 1 for all i, the optimal quality
level should be written as qi∗ (h) = min{q̂i (h), 1}, rather than
qi∗ (h) = q̂i (h). In this case, while the analysis is more complex
than for Theorem 4, we can also demonstrate that a unique
optimal h exists and satisfies h∗ ≤ w.
IV. COMPARISON OF PBC AND TSP
In Section II-C, we demonstrated analytically that PBC always outperforms the TSP. However, TSP is more widely used
in practice. When quality is of importance to their competitive advantage, e.g., when reputation is critical, buyers prefer to
contract with suppliers who are known to be capable of meeting
the buyer’s standards (e.g., through the qualification stage of
TSP), rather than contracting with suppliers of unknown quality

TABLE IX
PBC VERSUS TSP: IMPACT OF SPREAD IN SUPPLIERS’ UNIT COSTS
(δ = cH − cL )

δ
δ
δ
δ

=
=
=
=

1
2
3
4

% CB

% E [q ∗ ]

% π S∗

% CT

q TSP <
q PBC

C TTSP >
C TPBC

π STSP >
π SPBC

1.10%
3.86%
9.57%
23.73%

3.73%
9.67%
17.95%
36.42%

10.87%
11.02%
8.02%
−1.07%

0.92%
3.66%
9.99%
27.96%

68.75%
95.31%
100.00%
96.88%

87.50%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

89.06%
84.38%
68.75%
54.69%

and then penalizing for poor performance (e.g., through PBC).
Therefore, it is useful to understand the magnitude of the performance gap between TSP and PBC and to identify conditions
under which buyers do not lose much by using TSP.
We consider the case in which the suppliers are not all fully capable, i.e., the case in which qimax ≤ 1 for all i. Thus, we assume
the qimax follow a uniform[qL , qH ] distribution, with qH ≤ 1,
across the set of potential suppliers. As discussed in Section
III-A, analytical results are not possible for PBC for this setting.
Therefore, we will use numerical experiments to compare PBC
and TSP. Our numerical experiments follow the experimental
design outlined in Section III-A3. For PBC, we use the simulation approach outlined in Section III-A3. For TSP, we follow
the approach outlined in [7].
Tables VI–IX follow the same format as Tables II–V. In the
tables, % CB represents the amount by which the buyer’s expected cost under TSP exceeds the buyer’s expected cost under
PBC. Similarly, % E[q ∗ ] represents the amount by which the
expected delivered quality under PBC exceeds the expected delivered quality under TSP, while % πS∗ represents the amount
by which the winning supplier’s expected profit under TSP exceeds the winning supplier’s expected profit under PBC. Finally,
% CT represents the amount by which the expected total system
cost under TSP exceeds the expected system cost under PBC.
In these tables, the columns labeled q TSP < q PBC , CTTSP > CTPBC
and πSTSP > πSPBC show the percent of cases in which the expected delivered quality, system cost, and winning supplier’s
expected profit, have the relationship shown. Recall that the
buyer’s expected cost is always lower under PBC than under
TSP. The results in Tables VI–IX indicate that PBC generally
outperforms TSP from the perspective of the buyer’s expected
cost, the system expected cost and the expected delivered quality level. However, TSP generally outperforms PBC from the
perspective of the winning supplier’s expected profit. We next
consider some more detailed comparisons.
Table VI shows the impact of the number of potential suppliers on the performance of PBC relative to TSP. As n increases,
the performance of PBC relative to TSP improves, in terms of
both the buyer’s expected cost and the system expected cost.
The opposite is true for the winning supplier’s expected profit,
i.e., as n increases, the supplier’s profit under TSP improves relative to under PBC. To understand these results, note that under
PBC all n suppliers compete in the auction process. Under TSP,
only the subset of qualified suppliers is allowed to compete in
the auction. Thus, under TSP, the value of having more potential
suppliers, in terms of increased competition in the auction stage,
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is tempered by the qualification stage. Thus, the higher degree
of competition under PBC benefits the buyer and the system,
while the lower degree of competition under TSP benefits the
winning supplier.
Table VI also indicates that, as n increases, the difference
between the expected delivered quality under PBC and TSP
decreases. As discussed in [7], under the TSP there is a tradeoff
between the optimal quality level (threshold) and the number of
suppliers. Specifically, when the number of potential suppliers
is small, the buyer will set a low quality level (threshold) in
order to ensure that enough suppliers are qualified to maintain
competition in the auction stage. However, when n gets larger,
the buyer is able to be more stringent in the qualification stage,
setting a higher quality level (threshold), while still maintaining
competition in the auction stage. Thus, having a larger number
of suppliers will reduce the quality gap between PBC and TSP.
Table VII shows the impact of the unit warranty cost on the
performance of PBC relative to TSP. As w increases, the performance of PBC relative to TSP improves in terms of both the
buyer’s expected cost and the expected system cost. However,
the opposite is true for the winning supplier’s expected profit,
i.e., as w increases, the winning supplier’s expected profit under
TSP improves relative to under PBC. The explanation here is
similar to that provided for Table VI. Under PBC, the number of
suppliers competing in the auction, i.e., the level of competition,
is fixed. Under TSP, the buyer controls the level of competition
in the auction stage through the selection of the quality level
(threshold). When the warranty cost is low, the buyer is willing
to sacrifice quality for increased competition by setting a low
quality level (threshold). However, when the warranty cost increases, the buyer must focus more on the costs associated with
poor quality and thus will set a higher quality level (threshold),
which leads to fewer qualified suppliers. With fewer suppliers
competing under TSP compared to PBC, the winning supplier
is able to extract a higher profit.
Table VII also indicates that as w increases, the difference
between expected delivered quality levels under PBC and TSP
decreases. This is most likely due to the fact that when w increases the expected delivered quality levels are increased under
both PBC and TSP, along with the fact that both expected delivered quality levels are constrained by 1 (the maximum quality
capability). However, as w increases, the percentage of cases in
which PBC has a larger expected delivered quality level than
TSP increases.
Table VIII shows the impact of the lower bound on the suppliers’ quality capabilities on the performance of PBC relative
to TSP. While qL does not have a consistent impact on the
buyer’s expected cost, the expected system cost or the winning
supplier’s expected profit, a larger qL implies that the supplier
is less likely to have higher profit under TSP than under PBC.
Also, a larger qL causes a decrease in the difference in the expected delivered quality levels under PBC and TSP. This result
is likely due to the fact that a larger qL implies less spread in the
quality levels across suppliers.
Table IX shows the impact of the spread in the suppliers’
unit costs (δ = cH − cL ) on the performance of PBC relative to
TSP. As δ increases, the performance of PBC relative to TSP
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improves in terms of both the buyer’s expected cost and the
expected system cost. In addition, as δ increases, TSP becomes
less preferred by the supplier. Overall, as δ increases, all parties
become more likely to prefer PBC. Finally, as δ increases, the
expected delivered quality also improves for PBC relative to
TSP.
As noted in the discussion of Table V, under PBC, a larger
δ = cH − cL leads to lower expected cost for the buyer and
higher expected profit for the winning supplier. The same result
holds under TSP. However, the benefits to the buyer of a larger
δ are more substantial under PBC than under TSP. The larger
number of suppliers competing in the auction stage under PBC
implies that the buyer can take more advantage of the potential
for low unit costs for the suppliers when δ is larger than she can
under TSP, when fewer suppliers compete in the auction stage.
Thus, as δ increases, the performance of PBC relative to TSP,
from the perspective of the buyer’s cost, improves.
Similarly, as δ = cH − cL increases, the performance of PBC
relative to TSP, from the perspective of the winning supplier’s
profit, improves. To understand this, note that, from the perspective of the suppliers, TSP is less flexible than PBC. In other
words, under TSP, every qualified supplier sets their quality level
equal to the threshold Q. As a result, as δ increases, the expected
delivered quality increases at a slower rate under TSP than under
PBC. However, under PBC, the suppliers can adjust their delivered quality with greater flexibility, i.e., the qi∗ will vary across
the suppliers, which leads to a greater differentiation between
the suppliers and a larger value of CS∗ [2] (h) − CS∗ [1] (h). Thus, as
δ increases, the winning supplier’s profit increases more quickly
under PBC than under TSP.
In summary, a larger δ = cH − cL implies a greater degree
of differentiation between potential suppliers. Our results thus
indicate that PBC increasingly outperforms TSP, on all performance measures, as this level of differentiation increases. This
is an important insight for buyer’s when designing their sourcing
processes. While in some cases, for practical reasons, the buyer
may prefer TSP over PBC despite the lower cost associated with
PBC, the buyer must be careful when selecting TSP if there is a
high level of variation in the potential suppliers’ unit costs.
V. PBC: ASYMMETRIC PENALTY/REWARD FUNCTION
The above analysis assumes a symmetric and linear
penalty/reward function, i.e., H(qi ; Q) = h(qi − Q), where h
is the penalty/reward rate. We next consider anasymmetric
penalty/reward function of the form: H(qi ; Q) = h1 (qi − Q) if
qi ≥ Q and H(qi ; Q) = h2 (qi − Q) if qi < Q, where h2 > h1 .
Thus, if qi > Q, then H(qi ; Q) > 0 represents a reward paid to
the supplier. If qi < Q, then H(qi ; Q) < 0 represents a penalty
charged to the supplier. The buyer must set h1 and h2 , as well
as Q.
For this penalty/reward function, the optimal quality level and
the cost for supplier i are presented in the technical appendix.
Characterizing the winning supplier, and determining the optimal penalty and reward rates for the buyer, are challenging.
In addition, unlike for the symmetric penalty/reward function
case, the quality threshold Q does not cancel out of the buyer’s
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TABLE X
COMPARISON OF ASYMMETRIC AND SYMMETRIC PENALTY/REWARD
FUNCTIONS

Average
Minimum
Maximum

% CB

% CT

% E [q ∗ ]

%h

0.24%
0.00%
2.06%

0.37%
0.00%
3.79%

2.11%
0.00%
11.82%

−1.39%
−20.00%
10.00%

cost function, and thus the buyer has a three-dimensional (3-D)
strategy space (h1 , h2 , Q). Thus, analytical results are not possible. We therefore conducted a set of numerical experiments,
following the methodology and experimental design described
in Section III-A3, in order to understand how the results for
the asymmetric penalty/reward function will differ from those
with the symmetric penalty/reward function, as presented in
Section III. To determine the optimal h1 , h2 , and Q to minimize the buyer’s expected cost CB (h1 , h2 , Q), we performed
an exhaustive search. Specifically, we considered h1 ∈ [0, w],
in increments of 0.05, h2 ∈ [h1 , w], in increments of 0.05, and
20 values of Q, equally spaced between qL and qH .
The results are shown in Table X. In the table, % CB represents the percentage difference between the buyer’s expected
cost under the symmetric and asymmetric cases, i.e., % CB =
C (h ∗ )−C (h ∗1 ,h ∗2 ,Q ∗ )
|. Since the symmetric penalty/reward
| B C B (h ∗B,h ∗ ,Q
∗)
1
2
function is a special case of the asymmetric penalty/reward function, the buyer’s optimal cost will always be higher for the symmetric case. However, due to the use of simulation to estimate
the cost functions, as well as the limitations of the 3-D search
process described above, in some cases we have that CB (h∗ ) is
slightly (no more than 2.06%) less than CB (h∗1 , h∗2 , Q∗ ). Thus,
we report the absolute value of the percent difference. The
columns labelled % CT and % E[q ∗ ] consider the difference
in the expected total system cost and the expected delivered
quality, and are calculated analogously to % CB . The final column compares the penalty/reward rates. Specifically, we first
h ∗ −h ∗
h ∗ −h ∗
compute % h1 = h ∗ 1 and % h2 = h ∗ 2 . We then let % h =
1
2
% h1 if E[q ∗ ] > Q∗ and % h = % h2 if E[q ∗ ] ≤ Q∗ . Thus, we
compare the symmetric penalty/reward rate to the relevant rate
for the asymmetric case, i.e., to the rate that is applied in the
optimal solution for the asymmetric case. When E[q ∗ ] > Q∗
(E[q ∗ ] ≤ Q∗ ), the reward (penalty) will be applied.
Table X indicates that, although the buyer’s expected cost
will be lower under the asymmetric penalty/reward function, the
buyer will not see a significant loss if he chooses to implement
the simpler symmetric function. Our numerical results indicate
that the buyer’s expected cost and realized quality, as well as
the expected system cost, do not significantly differ between
the two types of function. Finally, in the technical appendix, we
provide some intuition for the observation that the performance
of the symmetric and asymmetric penalty/reward functions are
quite similar.
VI. CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
In this paper, we compare the performance of two mechanisms that are appropriate, and commonly used in practice,

when the buyer has uncertainty regarding the potential suppliers’ costs and quality capabilities: the TSP and PBC. We do
so using a model setting that captures several complexities not
generally considered in the existing literature. Specifically, our
model captures the fact that suppliers will generally set their
quality levels endogenously, in response to the incentives provided by the sourcing process design. In addition, our model
captures the reality that potential suppliers will often have differing quality capabilities, which constrain the quality levels
they can offer to the buyer. Finally, our model uses a heterogeneous production cost function to capture how the suppliers’
production costs vary with quality.
We find that PBC always outperforms TSP from the perspective of the buyer. This result is due, in part, to the fact that
the suppliers’ quality levels are endogenous, set optimally in
response to the buyer’s sourcing process design. PBC provides
the suppliers with the flexibility to choose the quality level to
minimize their own costs, given their quality capability and the
penalty/reward rate assessed by the suppliers. TSP, on the other
hand, imposes a minimum quality level across all of the potential suppliers. Thus, TSP does not provide the same level
of flexibility for the suppliers to adjust their quality levels to
their own cost structure. In addition, PBC allows all potential
suppliers to compete in the bidding, while TSP allows only the
subset of qualified suppliers to bid. This increased competition
in the bidding stage also favors PBC from the perspective of the
buyer.
While PBC can be shown to outperform TSP, in practice TSP
is more widely used, for a number of practical, but hard to quantify, reasons. Thus, it is useful to understand the magnitude of
the performance gap between TSP and PBC in order to identify
conditions under which buyers do not lose much by choosing
TSP. We find that PBC is most beneficial to the buyer when the
spread in the potential suppliers’ costs is large and when the unit
warranty cost is large. Thus, a buyer who faces significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers’ costs, and for whom maintaining
a high level of quality is critical, should give extra consideration
in implementing PBC, despite the practical benefits of TSP.
We also studied how the expected delivered quality differs
under TSP and PBC. We find that the delivered quality is generally higher under PBC than under TSP and that the gap between
the quality levels is largest when the spread in the potential suppliers’ costs is large and when the number of potential suppliers
and unit warranty cost are small. We find that the expected delivered quality will increase towards the system optimal quality
level as the number of potential suppliers increases. Finally,
while the buyer always prefers to source through PBC, we find
that the winning supplier is generally better off under TSP. The
supplier’s preference for TSP is strongest when the number of
suppliers is large, the spread in the suppliers’ costs is small, and
the unit warranty cost is large.
Given that the buyer prefers PBC to TSP, we also consider
how the optimal penalty/reward rate varies with the problem
parameters. We find that the optimal rate is always less than
the unit warranty cost. In addition, when the suppliers are fully
capable, the optimal penalty/reward rate is proportional to the
unit warranty cost. Thus, PBC with a symmetric and linear
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penalty/reward function is a form of warranty cost sharing. The
optimal penalty/reward rate is largest when the number of potential suppliers is large and the unit warranty cost is large.
The former point indicates that more competition between the
suppliers enables the buyer to pass more of the warranty costs
onto the winning supplier. The latter point implies that when the
warranty cost is large, the buyer must provide more incentive
to the suppliers to provide high-quality products. These results
provide guidance regarding how to set the penalty/reward rate
for firms that choose to source using the PBC approach.
Finally, we note some future research directions. It would be
useful to consider a setting in which the suppliers have limited
capacity and thus the buyer may need to contract with multiple
suppliers. In addition, there may be some settings in which it
would not be feasible to allow all suppliers to bid, regardless
of their quality capabilities, e.g., there may be a hard minimum
on the quality level that must be achieved by the suppliers. In
such settings, a pure PBC approach would not be appropriate.
However, a hybrid approach, combining first a qualification
process, perhaps with the quality threshold set to the minimum
acceptable level, followed by a PBC mechanism, may be a
better approach. The design and performance of such hybrid
mechanisms is an important topic for future research.
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